… it is still evident, that pain and pleasure, if not the sources of moral distinctions, are at least inseparable from them. A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when presented to us, tho’ only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us. On the other hand, cruelty and treachery displease from their very nature; nor is it possible ever to reconcile us to these qualities, either in ourselves or others. Virtue, therefore, produces always a pleasure distinct from the pride or self satisfaction, which attends it: Vice, an uneasiness separate from the humility or remorse.
Hume’s moral theory seems to go without saying: what pleases us enchants us (the Good); we don’t like what is painful (the Bad).
What pleases us satisfies us, it is a pleasure of the Pride (an important feeling in Hume’s philosophy); what we disapprove, of or feel uneasy about, we avoid (because what is unpleasant is linked to humility).
Living according to a moral theory that does not please us (for example, accomplish chaste and unpleasant actions merely in the name of a moral “good”) is not viable. In love, Hume invites us to listen to what pleases our partner, to flatter their pleasure and thus their pride; not to act in the name of an abstract “good,” but rather be guided by what pleases each other.